Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology
Volume 61 | Issue 1

Article 10

1970

The Use of Strategies in Organized Crime Control
Dwight C. Smith
Ralph F. Salerno

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/jclc
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Criminology Commons, and the Criminology and Criminal
Justice Commons
Recommended Citation
Dwight C. Smith, Ralph F. Salerno, The Use of Strategies in Organized Crime Control, 61 J. Crim. L. Criminology & Police Sci. 101
(1970)

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology by an authorized editor of Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

Vol. 61, No. 1
Printed in U.S.A.

THE JOURNAL or CnnmAn LAw, CnnymoLOGy AND PoLicE ScieEzn
Copyright 0 1970 by Northwestern University School of Law

THE USE OF STRATEGIES IN ORGANIZED CRIME CONTROL
DWIGHT C. SMITH, JR.

AND

RALPH F. SALERNO

Dwight C. Smith, Jr. is presently Director of Institutional Research at the State University of New
York at Albany. From 1965 to 1967 h served as Assistant Deputy Director for Systems Planning &
Research with the New York State Identification and Intelligence System. He has also served as a
Visiting Associate Professor at the John Jay College of Criminal justice.
Ralph F. Salerno has, since his retirement in 1967, been a consultant to several legislative and investigative groups. He had served for twenty years in the Central Investigations Bureau of the New
York City Police Department investigating major racketeers and organized crime. In 1963 he was assigned to work with the U. S. Senate Subcommittee on Investigations, and in 1966 was the only police
office to serve as a consultant to the Task Force on Organized Crime of the President's Crime Commission and is coauthor with John Tompkins of Crime Confedraton.-EDiToR.
An earlier article in this journal described briefly
some research efforts undertaken in New York
State from 1965 to 1967 for the purpose of developing a theoretical framework for organized
crime control.' This project was initiated in conjunction with a series of conferences, held at
Oyster Bay, Long Island, on combating organized
crime. 2 The discussion at those conferences, as well
as in the research project itself, began with an effort to define organized crime in terms that would
contribute to effective control responses. Its activities and outward appearance were describedthe nature of its crimes and the style of its members. But it soon became apparent that descriptions of personal behavior and appearance, though
ultimately important, were not the key to control.
Those descriptions might help in the process of
identifying, apprehending, convicting, and punishing individual members of organized crime, but
would do little to restrict or contain the organization itself. Consequently, the focus shifted to the
organization of organized crime, as a phenomenon
whose functions and internal rationale are more
significant to a theory of control than the individuals through whom it operates. Subsequent
studies by Cressey, Gardiner, and Schelling 3-

each concerned with different aspects of the organizational phenomenon-support this change of
focus and suggest different ways of approaching
the definition question that will contribute substantially to the ultimate effectiveness of control
efforts.
A logical second step in the development of a
theory of control would be to determine what
society's-and particularly law enforcement'sresponse should be to the phenomenon defined.
The lack of an adequate functional definition of
organized crime has restricted this step considerably; but preliminary efforts suggested that
the definition of alternative actions depended also
on a better understanding of the tools available for
control activities. In particular, a better understanding dearly was required of the nature and use
of information in organized crime control. Accordingly, New York State undertook a study of
the manner in which national intelligence theory
and practice might be modified to meet the circumstances of organized crime. Through that
study, which was prepared for the Third Oyster
Bay Conference, three concepts were identified
that have a significant bearing upon potential control measures: the concept of strategic intelligence
as a tool for determining and reviewing long-range
programs; the concept of a set of inter-jurisdictional mechanisms for exchanging information and
coordinating policy and action among separate
agencies of government; and the concept of an active, analytic intelligence capability at the heart of
strategic intelligence operations. 4

I See SnTm, Cooperative Action in Organized Crime
Control, J. Cnme L., C. & P.S., December 1968.
2 The first two conferences were described in CoxBATING ORGANIZED CRmE, a Report of the 1965 Oyster
Bay Conferences on CombatingOrganizedCrime (Albany,
New York: Office of the Counsel to the Governor, April
1966).
2 CRssEy, The Functions and Structures of Criminal
Syndicates; GARDINER, Wincanton: the Politics of Corruption; ScHELIN G, Economic Analysis of Organized
ing Office, 1967). Also CRassny THEz OF A NATION
Crime: President's Commission on Law Enforcement
(New York Harper & Row 1969).
4 See A Theory of Organized Crime Control: A Preand Administration of Justice, TAsK FoRcE REPORT:
(Washington: Government Print- liminary, Statement prepared by the technical staff
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With this preliminary description of the nat ure
of organized crime and the basic intelligence tools
that would be required for an effective control program, the question of response returned to the
* foreground. What can, and should, be done about
organized crime? The act of stating the question in
advance of action implies, of course, that the response is (and will be) a series of deliberate decisions based upon prior investigation and analysis,
not an automatic or mechanical reaction to a particular stimulus. The respondent tries to understand and define (particularly in terms of criminal
law) the organized crime problem; identifies an
objective-such as successful prosecution for a
specific crime-to be achieved; and deploys resources to meet that objective. In other words,
existing methods of operation employ strategies,
however simple and rudimentary they may be.
The focus, then, is not upon defining a new tool but
upon understanding better (and thereby increasing
its potency), and utilizing more effectively, an
existing tool.
CURRENT STRATEGIES.
The purpose of any strategy is to provide a
planning and action framework in which existing
knowledge and resources can be utilized for effective achievement of stated goals. The goal in
this instance is control of organized crime. In brief,
present strategies employed in law enforcement
activities can be summarized as being aimed primarily at the individuals in organized crime, rather
than at the organization itself. That focus arises
from the fact that law enforcement's response to
organized crime has, by and large, been merely an
extension of its response to other, "unorganized"
crime. But, as will be noted later, the peculiar
nature of organized crime necessitates different
responses than those appropriate for ordinary
crime.
Current strategies fall mainly into four categories: attrition, exposure, harassment, and the
"Ostrich" practice. A brief description of each
category follows.
1. Attrition. The most commonly employed
strategy is that of attrition, in which individual
suspects are apprehended and prosecuted for
specific alleged crimes under due process of law.
The intensity of effort devoted to organized crimiand consultants of the New York State Identification
and Intelligence System, as a background paper for the
Third Oyster Bay Conference (Albany, New York:
NYSIIS, April 1966).
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nals in contrast to that applied to incidental or
street crime may be varied, of course, depending
upon assessment of local conditions. The main
approach has been and continues to be the apprehension of a person who is violating (or has violated) the law by means of penalties calculated to
remove him from society and, using his confinement as an example, to deter others from similar
activities. Investigating and prosecuting agencies
strive to put individual criminals in prison for the
most serious charge on which a case may be made.
Often for lack of sufficient court admissible evidence, law enforcement agencies must be content
with obtaining contempt or perjury indictments
via investigative commission or grand jury hearings.
This traditional approach is certainly best suited
for coping with individual criminals. But in the
case of organized crime, such losses can be absorbed; even higher attrition rates than are now
obtained by present efforts could probably be
sustained, because this is essentially an attrition
of nonentities as far as organized crime is concerned; it scarcely touches the "higher-ups." Except for the increased business overhead occasioned
by the need to provide lawyers and maintain
families during incarceration of their supporters
and by consequent disruption of the daily activities of affected members, the organization is not
harmed by attrition. Individual units continue to
function unimpaired. Even important decisions
can continue to be rendered from within prison
walls. The strategy would have to be applied more
frequently and involve "successful" convictions
(i.e., convictions that will survive appeals to
hikher courts-presently a discouragingly negative
factor in application of the attrition strategy) and
sentences for much longer prison terms entailing
more isolated confinement before it would be likely
to be at all effective.
In absolute terms, however, the potential effectiveness of attrition remains low. The primary
limitation can be illuminated by reference to the
stimulus of the attrition strategy. The investigation, arrest, and prosecution cycle that is characteristic of current attrition policies is almost
always a reaction to an overt act and the reaction
ten ds to be directed primarily at the perpetrator
of the act. While this is desirable and necessary,
organized crime is managed and directed from one
level of the organization while the actual crimes
are carried out by personnel within another level.
Thus, reaction to an overt act currently results in
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a majority of the available law enforcement resodrces being expended on the least valuable, most
easily replaced members of the organization.
Moreover, since the levels of authority within the
criminal organization are very thoroughly insulated from one another, any attempt to expand
the prosecution to superiors and other members of
the organization usually ends in failure. •
2. Exposure. A second strategy frequently employed is exposure. Congressional investigating
committees, state investigating commissions, and
citizen crime commissions have been powerful
means for focusing public attention on the problem. Often tighter legislation and stricter application of the attrition strategy is obtained as a byproduct of such investigations. However, public
interest invariably subsides upon the conclusion of
an investigation. Without sustained application, or
utilization of related actions when appropriate, the
strategy is ineffective in the long run. Indeed, in
some instances exposure may be self-defeating as a
strategy. A notorious public reputation-increased by public attention-aids coercive activities and creates fear in all who are affected by
the subject. He may become so notorious that he
never has to actually use threatening words; his
victims all "think" to the same effect.
3. Harassment.To the distress of many citizens
concerned with fair and equitable application of
law, a strategy of harassment has sometimes been
employed. The strategy may use the technique of
frequent arrests for vagrancy or other relatively
minor charges; it has many other techniques. For
general purposes, the strategy probably costs more
than it is worth in law enforcement resources, and
it may also produce undesirable public relation
side effects. Recent changes in the New York State
Penal Code have, in any event, eliminated many of
the pertinent offenses (other than indirect harassment, as with traffic violations), such as vagrancy,
that might be used within that state.
4. The Ostrich Practice. Another- practice-primarily defensive or passive in outlook-is to ignore
organized crime and to stoutly maintain that it is
nonexistent in a given jurisdiction. There are
varied reasons for this practice. Most community
leaders and public officials try to avoid bad publicity for their city; they want to remain convinced that organized crime is not a local problem.
Then, too, the local sense of propriety is offended.
Most people would like to believe that their community is not an attractive market for the forms
of vice with which organized crime has been his-

torically associated. Finally, there is the harried
chief of police who is doing the best he can, despite
public apathy and the lack of sufficient resources,
to combat organized criminals operating in his
city. He may feel that he cannot afford to advertise
his lack of success. Unfortunately, this practice,
whatever the reason for its use, operates in most
instances against the public interest rather than
against organized crime, since it effectively undermines nearly every obstacle that law enforcement
might be able to raise.
PROBLEMS IN DEINNG STRATEGrEs
Current law enforcement measures directed
against organized crime as an entity apart from
incidental or predatory crime are largely ineffective. The members of one work group at the Second
Oyster Bay Conference on Combating Organized
Crime concluded that "The percentage of convictions in cases involving the leaders of organized
crime is so low as to cast some doubt upon the
value of further prosecutions." At the same time,
they noted that "where prosecution has been active, organized crime... definitely may be curtailed.... (Consequently, every) available legal
means should be employed to continue prosecution
in appropriate instances." I
The infiectiveness of present measures is due
largely to the fact that law enforcement is confronted with a real dilemma in its choice of strategies to deal with organized crime. By definition,
and by all available proof, its adversary is well
organized. In contrast, law enforcement is constrained by fragmented authority, procedural
limitations, and a conventional approach to law
enforcement in which action is directed essentially
against isolated individuals rather than the organization to which they belong.
It is apparent that the traditional law enforcement approach of prosecuting individual criminals
for specific crimes must not only be drastically
improved but must be supplemented with new
strategies and techniques that weaken the effectiveuess of criminal organizations, while maintaining a basic posture that is consistent with
existing procedural law.
But how well can new strategies be defined? At
the outset, several comments about "strategies" in
relation to organized crime may be pertinent.
First, there are several levels at which strategies
may be identified. Indeed, the concept can be ap5
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plied simultaneously to a broad goal, such as reduction in the volume of gambling activity in a
community, and to a major segment of that plan,
such as the development of criteria for determining
where, when, and how to initiate continued surveillance of certain aspects of the suspected gainbling operation. The multi-level nature of strategies need not be confusing in practice if they are
dearly defined in terms of objective and context.
Second, there is a wide range of strategies which
can be combined in different measures for different
circumstances. Some may relate directly to specific
enforcement activity, such as a surveillance that is
intended to lead to apprehension; some may be
concerned with intelligence collection or analysis as
a prelude to enforcement action; some may be concerned with counter-measures that would deny
success to an organized crime activity without
directly suppressing it; some may involve resource development, such as the training of
specialized manpower for organized crime control.
Even the simple listing of some categories of strategies suggests their range and potential interrelationships.
Third, every strategy depends upon available
knowledge of organized crime. Such knowledge
today is fragmentary (particularly in the light of
the lack of mechanisms for sharing the data and
analyses that do exist); accordingly, the ability to
identify the best or optimum strategies is limited.
With proper nurture knowledge of organized crime
will grow, however, and with it should come the
development of greater sophistication in defining
and utilizing strategies. In the foreseeable future,
the parallel growth in understanding and capabilities will be dear.
Fourth, strategies must be dynamic in order to
keep pace with a dynamic adversary. There will be
a continuing process of defining, testing, evaluating, and modifying. Thus, even if intelligence concerning/organized crime were highly developed,
specific strategies would be difficult to define in any
final sense.
Fifth, strategies can be defined meaningfully in
terms of public policies which are by no means clear
today. What is society's ultimate objective concerning organized crime? Do we intend to eliminate
it in the long run? (parenthetically, if it is the
objective, how realistic is it?) Or do we intend to
control its activity, either at existing levels or at
some earlier and lower level? If the real objective is
some level of control rather than elimination, how
can mechanisms be identified, studied, and
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utilized--as others have suggested in relation to
international affairs'--through which "tolerable"
levels of organized crime activity and behavior
can be defined and monitored? Alternatively,
should the public focus be upon modifying present
legal sanctions on human behavior, or present restrictions on corporate action, that lead to the
frictions that nourish organized crime? How can
the public be persuaded that the functions of
organized crime are neither beneficial nor harmless, so that its excursions into legitimate society
will be rejected or blocked at the outset? Whatever objective, or group of objectives, are chosen
will dearly influence the kinds of strategies that
might be adopted.
Sixth, the range of strategies available will be
governed by what is legal. For example, selective
assassination might be a highly useful (and even
appealing!) strategy in some instances, but it
would not be legal. The same could be said for provisions governing excessive detention, confessions,
admissibility of evidence, etc. If organized criminals could be handled as enemies in time of war,
rather than as citizens with the rights of due
process, they might have been eliminated long ago.
The privileges of citizenship, as exemplified by
"due process," are fumdamental to our form of
government, however, and must be preserved even
if their enforcement appears to give undue protection to persons who have rejected the responsibilities of citizenship.
Finally, the range of useful strategies will be
governed by the mechanisms available to support
them-preliminary intelligence, subsequent action
mechanisms, lublic support, and- governmental
resistance to corruption. Strategies depend upon
the amount and level of available intelligence concerning the object of their attention; the extent to
which strategies can be implemented will depend
upon available directing and action agencies,
public approval and support, and honest government in all areas concerned with criminal justice.
These mechanisms are not automatically available
to the dedicated opponent of organized crime.
They cannot be obtained by law enforcement acting solely on its own initiative and authority. Indeed, the manner in which they can be obtained
needs to be the subject of considerable, intensive
analysis and strategic planning.
As these comments indicate, this paper cannot
6 For example, ScxLiNG AND HALPEIN, STRATEGY
AND Aius CONTROL (New York: Twentieth Century
Fund, 1961).
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possibly cover all, or even many, of the strategies
that are pertinent to organized crime control. In
any case, the discussion that follows is within the
context of an assumed definition of organized
crime that dearly needs further analysis and refinement. Some strategies pertinent to law enforcement can be described, however, to demonstrate
the general usefulness of the concept of "strategies"
as an analytic and planning tool; and through the
law enforcement situation, the potential significance to organized crime control of high-order
intelligence resources and interjurisdictional
coordination can be demonstrated. That demonstration may contribute to the larger problem of
obtaining adequate support mechanisms.
Organized crime derives its strength from an effective organization much as trained infantry
gains its strength under stress from unit cohesion
and esprit de corps, and not from the mere addition
of the firepower of its rifles. For both types of
organizations, individuals including top leaders are
expendable. The effects of constant attrition can be
overcome, unless the rate of attrition is quite high.
If, as is frequently conceded, the current active
strategies of attrition, harassment, or exposure,
are not succeeding, if we cannot attack organized
criminals as though they were a foreign enemy in
the field, and if the underlying strength of organized crime is to be found in its organization, then it
seems evident that new strategies directed against
the organization itself must be devised. These
strategies must be designed to exploit the potential limitations to organization strength that
arise from the peculiarities of individuals or groups
or that take advantage of weaknesses in their
organizational code.
As previously noted, the strategies and techniques currently in use will curtail organized crime
to some extent when they result in successful
prosecution but to have any lasting or significant
effect, the rate at which criminals engaged in
organized crime are brought to prosecution must be
increased. Because it is not practical to multiply
current efforts (and concurrently multiply their
costs) in-order to increase the prosecution rate, new
strategies and techniques must be developed that
will produce higher attrition rates for the effort
expended or will disrupt the equilibrium of the
organization suiciently to reduce its strength.
Five potential strategies may be suggested that
would attack the organization of organized crime
as well as its individual members:
a. Subversion: tactical actions calculated to

breed internal dissention, to capitalize on existing
dissention or to create distrust and suspicion.
b. Alienation: a wide variety of tactics devised
to demonstrate and emphasize the disadvantages
of membership in organized crime, and to alienate
aspirant members from recruiters.
c. Disruption: concentrated effort to disrupt or
dislocate organized crime activities, thus reducing
the return on investments or, alternatively, increasing the cost of the enterprise.
d. Penetration: efforts to buy information or
informants, or to penetrate organized crime with
law enforcement representatives.
e. Blocking: the use of public education to
assist concerned persons to confine or eliminate
further organized crime activities in their fields of
interest.
The utilization of any of these strategies must be
based on a recognition that due process of law must
be observed at all times. In addition, considerable
study, preparation, and realignment of available
resources will be required. The legal aspects of new
strategies and techniques must be carefully considered to protect the civil liberties of those involved and to ensure that all resulting law enforcement activities remain within the law. When
aggressively used, however, in combination with
the attrition and exposure strategies, the new
strategies will place the initiative, the prerequisite
to successful combat, in the hands of law enforcement personnel.
The strategies suggested here are useful to the
extent that they illustrate the nature of a strategic
approach to the problem of organized crime control. But the utility of any strategy-and, to a
degree, th6 value of the strategic approach-depends upon its relationship to the real world. To
test these relationships, three tactics can be analyzed that are used in organized crime controlraids, intensive investigations, and cooperative
actions-through which the usefulness of new
strategies may be illuminated.
THE APPLICATION Or SriATEGIEs
1. The Raid. As noted above, anti-organizational
strategies "must be designed to exploit the potential limitations to organization strength that
arise from the peculiarities of individuals or
groups .... 1"One such potential limitation lies in
the fact that organizations require some degree of
direction .which, in anything short of an absolute
dictatorship, means occasional policy meetings of
individuals (or their representatives) occupying
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power positions within the organization. In the
case of organized crime, with its basically decentralized structure of operations, the central
function may be mediative or judicial in purpose
If those meetings can be discovered and disrupted,
the ability of the organization to function effectively may be impaired. The key to success is
knowledge about an intended or existent meeting.
It is apparent that organized crime requires such
meetings; two policy meetings that were discovered
and disrupted under different circumstances were
the Apalachin meeting of November 14, 1957, and
the La Stella restaurant meeting of September 22,
1966.
The Apalachin meeting was discovered by thenSergeant Edgar Crosswell, of the New York State
Police as part of his one-man intelligence effort to
watch the activities of Joseph Barbara, Sr., a local
resident whom he knew to have an impressive
criminal background, and whom he suspected of
certain legal violations. Crosswell's immediate
interest on November 13th was a chance circumstance of observing Joseph Barbara Jr. making
motel reservations for expected guests. The chance
nature of Crosswell's discovery is emphasized by
the state of law enforcement intelligence activities
within New York State at that time. The only
law enforcement body within the state which had
a functioning intelligence unit was the New York
City Police Department. The Federal Narcotics
Bureau, in enforcing laws over which it had jurisdiction, did gather some intelligence information
in the State about known and suspected violators;
but the Federal Bureau of Investigation did not
have similar jurisdiction in areas relating to
organized crime until (primarily) new legislation
was enacted in 1961.
Discovery of the La Stella meeting, on the other
hand, followed years of gathering and analyzing
intelligence concerning the current organized crime
scene, and field operations undertaken in response
to intelligence conclusions. It had been known for
some time that Thomas Luchese (alias "ThreeFinger Brown") had been hospitalized for surgery
to remove a brain tumor, and that his prognosis
was not good. This knowledge, related to other
knowledge concerning the procedures and methods
of the Cosa Nostra, led to the following analysis:
It would be likely that Luchese's illness would
lead to discussions about an interim leader and/
or eventual successor. The leaders (or trusted
7 See CxassEY. op. cif.,pp. 33-34. THEFT OF A
p. 111.
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associates) of the several Cosa Nostra groups in
the New York City metropolitan area would
have to meet for such discussions and a subsequent decision that could be relayed to the rest
of organized crime. If the decision had in fact
already been made, surveillance might reveal
who had been selected for a new and more important role.
A group of people were identified who might
attend such a meeting, or whose activities would
indicate the identity of a new leader already chosen. Surveilances were established within the
limitations of manpower available; through one
such surveillance the New York City Police Department was led to the La Stella Restaurant
meeting.
A significant difference between the two meetings
concerned their respective locations. Since the
Apalachin meeting took place on private property,
police action was limited. The two State troopers
and two agents of the Alcohol Tax Unit of the
Treasury Department who conducted the raid,
had to defer all action until the attendees departed
the private premises and reached a public road in
the now infamous "hurried departure." Because of
this technicality, only 63 persons were identified as
being present, when later evidence indicated the
true number to be over 100.
The Queens meeting, on the other hand, was in a
public restaurant where police action was not
similarly inhibited; and the detectives concerned
knew the identity of many of the attendees, including some of those from out of town, before any action was taken.
Another difference related to legal.circumstances.
In the Apalachin case, legal opinion was that there
were no clearcut grounds for arrest or detention
beyond routine requirements such as identification
of motor vehicle operators. Nine years later in the
La Stella case, consultations between the District
Attorney and police intelligence personnel confirmed that the 13 persons apprehended could be
expected to have information of value to a grand
iury investigating several crimes of violence; they
were thus ordered to be taken into custody as
material witnesses.
Following the earlier meeting perhaps the most
effective action taken was by the State Commission
of Investigation which subpoenaed a number of the
delegates and jailed four of the principals for contempt of court because of their refusal to answer
questions. The contempt detentions were for as
long as 16 months, longer "sentences" than they
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had obtained in cases where they had been indicted
for murder.
The primary action of the federal government
took the form of prosecution for conspiracy to obstruct justice. The attorney in charge of the case
had to identify all the law enforcement personnel
who had conducted interviews either on November
14, 1957 or subsequently, when the conspirators
had returned to their own homes. Written reports
had to be gathered where they could be found; in
some jurisdictions there were no written reports of
interviews because of an underestimation of the
importance of the event.
In Queens county in 1966, however, there was an
immediate coordinated gathering of personnel and
reports which could be helpful to the District
Attorney. In addition to the New York City
Police, the state police, F.B.I., Federal Narcotics

Bureau, U.S. Marshal's Office, U.S. Immigration,
and other agencies participated in a review of pertinent information. District Attorneys' offices with
parallel interests and previous experience with the
parties concerned also cooperated fully.
The final test in either case is its results. Twentyone attendees at the Apalachin meeting were tried
in federal courts with 20 convicted; but the convictions were reversed in the appellate courts. In
The La Stella case, since Grand Jury questioning
had to be limited to crimes in Queens County, the
five dinner guests from out of town were excused
after satisfying the Grand Jury that they had no
direct knowledge of local crimes. Of the eight other
diners, one was excused for health reasons; the
remaining seven were indicted for criminal contempt of court for refusal to answer questions of the
grand jury. In either case, then, has there yet been
significant and lasting success in applying the
Attrition strategy. But in terms of "increasing the
cost" of directing organized crime, it would appear
that something was gained in terms of a Disruption
strategy. Even that gain was limited, however,
because the strategy has not been systematically
and continuously followed. The successful utilization of intelligence data and analysis at several
stages in the La Stella case indicates that the
strategy could be exploited if there were (a) continuing intelligence concerning organizational
behavior on the part of organized crime, including
intelligence regarding its tactical adjustments to
counter the strategy; (b) an interjurisdictional
mechanism for coordinating the disruption of similar policy meetings wherever they might occur; and
(c) further research and analysis to test the validity

of the underlying assumption that the strategy has
value, or to study whether gains other than organizational disruption are really more significant
in this form of combat. The latter point is particularly important, because there are serious questions
to be asked about the value of any raid. It may be
that the real business of organized crime is more
decentralized and that the only significance of
apprehending a gathering of known and powerful
members of organized crime is a short burst of
publicity, not a significant disruption in policy
coordination. A more useful strategy might be to
allow the meeting to occur and to attempt to obtain
and utilize as soon as possible the conclusions of the
meeting. For example, identifying a newly chosen
leader, and exposing that knowledge at an occasion
embarrassing to the new boss, might be an effective
way of undermining organized crime's confidence
in its invulnerability. But if the publicity attendant
upon a raid undermines the confidence of subordinates in their leadership (an assumption that
also would require careful exploration before it
could be accepted), a different and useful form of
disruption and organizational impairment might
have been served.
In any event, it is clear that current assessments
of strategy are limited by our lack of knowledge
concerning the organization and behavior of organized crime and by the absence of tested evaluation techniques for measuring the effect of a particular strategy.
2. Intensive Investigation. A law enforcement
officer was assaulted by a group of persons including Carmine Lombardozzi, a known and powerful
member of organized crime. The assault precipitated an intensive effort by the officer's agency to
apprehend and punish publicly the attackers, the
objective being to discredit Lombardozz i among
his friends. Many members of Lomba rdozzi's
"family" were detained for questioning; during
the course of the investigation an attempt was
made (and discovered) by the "family" to intimidate a principal witness.
The investigation was conducted in a way that
would emphasize the role of the initial assault, and
Lombardozzi's part in it, in spurring the investigation. No one in his family could miss the point that
it was Lombardozzi's "fault." This led, as intended,
to disenchantment on the part of many of Lombardozzi's associates, and to his demotion within
the "family" because of all the attention, or
"heat," that he had brought upon his fellows.
Thus, Alienation and Subversion strategies em-
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ployed by law enforcement reached th6 point where
the target's value to his organization was seriously
questioned. There were even discussions of violent,
punitive action that the organization might take
against him. Without question, this resulted in
disruption of his usual activities, as well as the
activities of others. He lost his usual aplomb and,
together with a loyal friend, fell into a behavior
pattern which became the basis for their being sent
to prison for violating a parole given as part of a
suspended sentence for an eailier court conviction.
So far, the strategies appeared successful. They
were based upon sound intelligence and an appreciation of what would happen if sufficient pressure
and notoriety were brought to bear on a vulnerable,
or potentially vulnerable, member of organized
crime.
But then, the strategy backfired. In an effect,
the law enforcement agency had "told" organized
crime that assaulting a law enforcement officer was
beyond the line of tolerable conduct. In the "telling," the organized crime family came off second
best; but the law enforcement unit failed to consider what counter-move organized -crime might
made. The nature of the investigation-the persons
interrogated and the questions asked-demonstrated to organized crime not only that one of its
members had misbehaved but, more importantly,
that there had been some previous penetration of
the organization. Someone on the inside had been
talking. The organized crime group realized that
their defensive structure needed mending, and they
responded by analyzing law enforcement's intelligence information. They noted which of their men
were interviewed, how much information could be
determined from the questions asked of them, etc.
Their analysis was successful: they identified a
person who had penetrated their ranks, and they
closed the gap by killing him.
There may be several lessons to be learned from
this experience, but certainly two of the most important ones are that increased use of sensitive
information requires delicate handling, and that
there is an absolute necessity to think beyond immediate circumstances. What organized crime
might learn about the extent of law enforcement
information must be kept to a minimum; and the
chain of responses and counteractions that may
follow any situation must be recognized and anticipated. The lessons are similar to the ones already
familiar to the district attorney or detective who
may need to convince a witness, by skillful questioning, to admit to information previously un-
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known or otherwise unobtainable to the questioner.
In unorganized crime the risk of revealing as much
information as is elicited is seldom high, because
the convicted defendant cannot immediately use
what he may learn. But the member of organized
crime has supporters and a continuing mechanism
available to pursue his cause for him. Unlike
"unorganized" crime, the game is not called after
the first out.
3. Coordinated Actions. Although not in itself a
strategy, coordination of effort as a strategic
principle can be of great benefit. It can result in a
tremendous increase of manpower and other resources applied to a particular case without individual agency expenses rising unnecessarily. Conversely, the lack of cooperation can lead to
interagency friction, expensive duplication of effort
and, more significantly, the exposure of each
separate project as the total amount of uncoordinated activity becomes visible. For example, two
or three separate surveillances in a relatively quiet
neighborhood are more likely to arouse suspicion
concerning some surveillance (no matter how
many) than one, well conducted surveillance.
Unfortunately, there are cases on record where
more than one agency has been found to be conducting a surveillance of the same person or event
without any effort being made at coordination. A
joint effort between three agencies could lead to
savings of 50 % to 663 % of manpower, with each
of the three agencies obtaining the same amount of
information through the use of two pieces of carbon
paper to type three copies of the same report.
There are some examples of useful cooperative
action. At the present time, for example, airport
coverage is provided at Toronto and Montreal by
three-man teams representing the Royal Canadian
Mounted Police, the Provincial (State) Police, and
the local metropolitan police department. Their
inquiries for cooperation on the American side of
the border, however, have made it evident that
similar coordinated and cooperative efforts seldom
exist in the United States.
Another example of cooperative action may be
found in the raid, conducted on May 8, 1967, on a
restaurant meeting of organized crime personalities
(and others) in Buffalo, New York. In this case,
the local police and the FBI jointly conducted the
raid, with representatives of the State Police on
hand as observers. Since the action involved 23 law
enforcement officers, the opportunity to share
manpower costs was a clear economic benefit to
each agency.
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Another real but seldom recognized return from
cooperative action may be its deterrent effect on
corruption. Although it can be argued that a security risk is taken when two or morelaw enforcement
agencies engage in joint planning and operations,
it is equally true that cooperative action increases
the risk of exposure inherent in corruption. Law
enforcement is not alone in having some secrets it
wants to keep; the corrupter from organized crime
is equally uninterested in discovery. If two agencies
engage in routine exchanges of information concerning investigative actions, the chances are increased of discovering the signs of corruption, such
as the suppression of data, the showing of "favoritism," or a pattern of systematically ignoring or
failing to pursue signs of organized crime activity.
Knowing that their efforts are being reviewed
might help both units to maintain a standard of
integrity and objectivity; also, the routine exchange of information could help each unit to
evaluate its own personnel.
The latter point was demonstrated in the 1965
suspension of two vice squad detectives in Rochester, New York. The detectives had made a secret,
unauthorized visit to the hangout of a local organized crime figure. Their visit was observed by an
FBI surveillance team; the Rochester police department learned of the visit when the FBI asked
why it had not received the customary copy of the
vice squad report which detectives would have
prepared if their visit had been a legitimate one.
The case, which was explored extensively by the
State Investigations Commission,' illustrates the
maxim that a person's standard of behavior can be
governed by whether he believes his actions will be
seen and reported.
Perhaps the most important value of cooperative
action, however, is one which unfortunately can
never be measured. To what extent is the possibility of cooperative action precluded by the lack of
opportunities or mechanisms for them? Without
question, the potential for cooperative action has
hardly been tapped; that untapped potential is a
real loss to organized crime control. As suggested
previously in this journal, "Some law enforcement
representatives understand the problem of organized crime and have invested significant resources
in control activities. But their effectiveness all too
often is discouragingly small because the activities
8 State of New York Commission on Investigation,
Report of at Investigation of Certain Organized Crime
Activities and Problems of Law Enforcenent in Rochester, New York (New York: State Commission on Investigations, September 1966).

of organized crime often are so much wider than the
jurisdiction of enforcement agencies .... -" 9 The
answer-which cries for recognition-is cooperative action.
CONCLUSION: THE INTELLIGENCE PROCESS
The preceding three examples of the uses of
strategy in organized crime control do not in any
sense cover the range of applications that would be
possible in a well-planned and executed control
program. Nevertheless, they say enough about the
subject to demonstrate how strategies and strategic
concepts can be used and how dependent they are
upon an adequate understanding of the intelligence
process.
That process, as it applies to organized crime
control, was described in the working paper noted
earlier in this article, prepared for the Third Oyster
Bay Conference on organized crime. For our present purpose it is sufficient to note that its overriding requirement, as exemplified in the situations
presented here, is a constant ability and willingness
to think. Although it may sound trite, it is dear
that law enforcement has yet to discover the practical limits of thinking--as the heart of intelligence
analysis and as a prelude to planning and action.
It is particularly dear that more attention must
be given to anticipating the countermove in the
development of any specific action strategy. Organized crime does not want to lose; it is flexible, and
willing, in most instances, to adjust its activities to
protect its future. The "Raid" tactic discussed
earlier is perhaps a case in point. The Apalachin
meeting was attended by representatives of all of
the major organized crime families that are understood to be represented on the "Board of Directors." Consequently, final policy decisions could be
made at that time. But at the La Stella meeting,
only five families were represented. Where were
the others? There is no dear evidence, but it seems
possible and likely that representatives of the other
families met elsewhere and that some mechanism
had been arranged to consolidate the views of the
two groups into a single policy position. This suggests a significant difference between 1957 and
1966 in the pattern of high-level meetings. The
difference does not appear to be one of convenience,
but rather an adjustment to a higher level of risk
occasioned by increased unfavorable publicity and
increased law enforcement activity in the decade
between the two meetings.
9 SMITH, op. cit.
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It is dear that these two patterns are not the
only mechanisms through which national policy is
established within organized crime. The Apalachin
meeting illustrates a traditional pattern followed
by an organization not fearful of discovery or disruption (that such a feeling was justified may be
shown in the fact that the only previous occasion
that a meeting was disrupted was in Cleveland in
1928, nearly thirty years before). Ray Martin has
suggested that another pattern was observed in
Miami Beach in 1962:
"The Mafia anticipated that its conclave
would be under surveillance. The dons did not
intend to repeat the debacle at Apalachin, where
they were trapped in the home of Joseph Barbara
long enough to be held up for embarrassing
national inspection. Their new tactics were simple but ingenious. The crime delegates checked
in at different fashionable hotels and motels at
the height of the vacation season. They convened
in no single hotel suite, conference room, or
auditorium. Instead, they met in pairs by prearrangement. They gathered in cocktail lounges
and coffee shops. They discussed their business
quietly, came to fundamental understandings,
and parted. They reached agreements by chainletter techniques. Even if tails had been attached
to every mobster and taps placed on every telephone-which could not and did not happen--it
would have been impossible for outsiders to learn
precisely who said what to whom. The syndicate
had business to attend to and it was determined
to attend to it. .. ,10
The conclusion that policy communications in
organized crime are responsive to fear of discovery
is, of course, tentative; it rests on very slim evidence. But there is enough surface logic to suggest
that someone should be studying the patterns of
communication in organized crime more intensively, in order to determine (a) what further
pattern shifts.might occur; (b) how those shifts
would be tracked; and (c) what is the most effective
way to disrupt the establishment of high-level
policy--i.e., what strategy should be followed in a
dynamic environment.
In addition, there is room for greater law enforcement appreciation for anticipating and preventing organized crime activity. Current practice
is often to react to an accomplished criminal act or
a continuing criminal situation, such as a gambling
joint. The ultimate aim must be to achieve a
10MARim, REVOLT ix T= MArIA (New York:
Duell, Sloan and Pierce, 1963), pp. 222-223.
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system which can predict accurately the moves of
organized crime, in advance; it then would be
possible to take preventive action in advance of
the overt criminal activity. Space does not permit a
full exploration of the values derived from anticipating and forestalling criminal action; its significance in "unorganized" crime cases is generally
recognized, and parallels can be drawn from them.
It is also clear that law enforcement should be
concerned about "getting the most for its money."
This principle has several aspects, only one of
which is the need for cooperative actio as discussed above. Another aspect is the value of extensive use of intelligence analysis. The best investment an agency may make is to have the right
person sitting in an office and "just thinking." He
may not appear productive, in terms of arrests
being made and beats being patrolled, but his
efforts can increase substantially the productivity
of the entire agency. A third aspect of this principle
is that of protecting intelligence, in order to obtain
the most from it. The less organized crime knows
about the nature and content of law enforcement
intelligence, the less it can adjust its activities for
self-protection The Lombardozzi incident demonstrates the point. If the law enforcement agency
concerned had attempted to determine what
organized crime might learn from the investigation,
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and had taken greater efforts to camouflage the
role and identity of its informant, the final consequence of his exposure might have been avoided.
A fourth aspect of this principle of economy
concerns the intelligence process itself. At the
present time targets for intelligence investigation
are selected on an uncoordinated, or random, basis.
Manpower is directed at targets 'B" and- "C" and
"D". When information is gathered and analyzed
revealing that the three targets are connected to
"A", the result is considered an effective intelligence product (fig. 1).
But note that the flow of information is from the
three to the one. A better way of linking associates,
interests, and relationships would be a "radical"
system, which would produce a greater yield, with
less usage of manpower and in a shorter period of
time (fig. 2).
In this instance, the prior focus is on predicting
where information is likely to cross, and in which
directions it may move. Where this approach has

been attempted, more and better intelligence information has resulted because the analysis has moved
from the central target "A" outward along lines
which clearly led to "B" and "C" and "". From
them, additional lines have been developed to other
satellites, with perhaps a return flow from some of
them to "A". With this approach, more targets are
covered, the development of investigations is more
orderly and better patterns develop: in sum, an
intelligence operation has been created which can
be given high marks for productivity and performance.
This discussion of the uses of strategy in organized crime control can be summarized by noting
its emphasis on sophisticated planning for development of resources, based upon a broad understanding of the intentions and capabilitiesof the adversary.
He is organized, dynamic, and self-perpetuating; in
response, our government strategies must be
flexible, sustained and grounded in effective intelligence operations.

